An address by Bruce N. Cameron, J.D.
Attorney, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
Delivered to the Christian Educators Association
July 3, 1997
Their limo had broken down right in front of the train station. So, John Sweeney, the President of
the AFL-CIO, Bob Chase, the President of the National Education Association, and Ron Carey, the
President of the Teamsters union, decided to take the train.
As they approached the ticket booth, Sweeney told the other two, «Trust me on these tickets. I’m
not the tycoon of the train unions for nothin’.» So he bought a single train ticket –just one– for all three
of them.
As they sat waiting in the station, three regular working «stiffs» bought their tickets and sat down
next to them. The working guys recognized the union chiefs and noticed they had only one ticket among
the three of them, so they asked, «How are all three of you going on the train with just one ticket?»
«Just watch,» Sweeney grinned.
When the train came, they all boarded and the three union chieftains trooped into the mens’
bathroom and they all squeezed into one stall. Pretty soon the ticket-collector came to the door of the
stall, calling out «tickets, tickets please.» Sweeney opened the door a crack and stuck out his one ticket.
Needless to say, the regular working guys were pretty impressed.
Later that day, they all found themselves again in the train station waiting for the return trip.
This time the three working guys had only one ticket among them. As they looked over at the union
bosses, not one of them had a ticket. «Wait a minute,» one of the workers said, «we understand now how
you three were able to ride on one ticket, but how do you do it with no ticket?»
Sweeney smiled and said, «Just watch.»
When the train came, the three workers got on and crammed themselves into a bathroom stall.
The union chiefs did the same in the stall next door. A few minutes later Sweeney slipped out of his stall
and called out, «tickets, tickets please.»
Maybe you are here today because this story seems familiar. Perhaps you have the feeling that
union officials want, or worse, have something of yours that does not belong to them? Do you think they
are tricking you out of your money? Maybe they are just threatening you to part with your money?
At the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation we get calls from employees every day
who object to being forced to join or financially support a labor union.
There is good news. No matter where you work, or who you work for, you are entitled to keep
what is yours; and refuse to have your money used to support principles, ideas and policies that are
directly opposed to your beliefs.
Two things can make a difference in how much you pay to the union. They are:
1. Geography; and,
2. The nature of your objection to supporting the union.
We can cover «geography» in 30 seconds. If you work in a Right To Work state (and there are
21 of them(1)) you can decide to pay the union nothing. The only exceptions are for employees who work
in the railroad and airline industries, and those who work on certain federal enclaves.
Explaining how the nature of your objection makes a difference in the amount you pay to the
union takes a bit longer. Draw a mental picture of a big circle. Included in that big circle are all kinds of
objections to unions. Inside the big circle of all objectors is a much smaller circle of a special kind of
religious objector. These religious objectors have special rights. Since this is the Christian Educators
Association, let’s start with the religious objectors and what better place to start than with a Bible story.
Imagine with me, a cool, clear morning. A wind is blowing off the Sea of Galilee.
Peter is standing on the porch, smelling the water, letting the breeze sweep over his face. On days like
this in Capernaum, Peter missed fishing. Soon he was lost in thought about the «big one» that didn’t get
away.
His pleasant daydream was abruptly interrupted by two official-looking gentlemen who suddenly
appeared on the porch next to him. Peter thought they looked like drachma collectors.
For those of you uncertain whether «drachma» is flora or fauna, it is neither. The word literally means
«fistfuls»– of money, that is. The drachma collectors were out gathering the temple tax which every
adult, male, Jew was required to pay.
This morning the drachma collectors had a specific target. That target was Jesus, Peter’s master.
So just as Peter was standing there, wishing he were fishing, the drachma collectors presented him with a
trick question. That question, found in the gospel of Matthew 17:24 was:
«Doesn’t your master pay the temple tax?»
Peter, being a little short on legal and accounting advice, considered only the obvious
implications of such a question. One who dodges taxes is dishonest. Perhaps disloyal. Taxes to support
the temple inject religious questions. So perhaps one who dodges temple taxes does not adhere to the
highest religious standards. At the very minimum a tax dodger is cheap. So in Matthew 17:25 Peter gives
the obvious answer: «Yes, of course, my master pays the temple tax.»
Peter is like me. I’m full of opinions about how my money should be spent. But money
questions for me are all hypothetical questions because I don’t control my money. Do you know the
standard marriage vows have this phrase, «I pledge my troth?» Do you know what a «troth» is? When I
was 23 I didn’t. I asked my wife-to-be what it was that I was pledging. She said, «Darling, troth means
treasure.» So they made that little substitution in my vows.
Like Peter, I don’t have any money.
Because Peter was like me in that regard, he had to walk into the house to get the temple tax
money. There he found, to his amazement, that the drachma collectors were not the only ones interested
in discussing taxes with him. Matthew 17:25 says:
When Peter came into the house, Jesus was the first to speak, «What do you think,
Simon» He asked, «from whom do the kings of the earth collect taxes — from their own
sons or from others?» (NIV*)
Peter began to think his answer might have been a little hasty. He had already confessed that he
believed that Jesus was the Son of the Living God ( 16:16). He knew that the temple was God’s
sanctuary among men. He knew that sons were normally exempt from taxation by their fathers. This
problem could give him a headache. Suddenly, more than ever, he felt he would rather be fishing.
The question of taxation had become a moral issue. If Christ is the Son of God, then He should
not pay the temple tax. For Him to pay the tax would be to acknowledge that He was not the Son of God.
Many teachers today are faced with a parallel problem. They work under a contract which
requires them to either join the teachers union, generally the National Education Association (NEA), or
pay fees to support the union. The drachma collectors come to these teachers and they make these same
kind of arguments: the teachers are told that if they fail to pay they are dishonest, disloyal or maybe just
cheap. Unfortunately, it does not stop with the «sticks and stones» kind of approach. They are also told
that if they do not pay they will be fired.
More and more, just like the light dawning on Peter, teachers today are seeing that serious moral
issues are at stake in the payment of these union fees. Teachers phone me all the time and say, «Do you
know that the NEA is pro-abortion? Do you know that the NEA promotes the homosexual life-style?
Do you know that the NEA attacks what I believe in, calling my Christian views ‘right-wing
extremism?'»(2) They ask, «How can I support both sides of these issues? On Sunday I hear that support
for these activities is sin. The following Monday I read a report in the union newsletter that I am paying
for those activities. How can I teach my Sunday school class on the evils of these sins, while being a part
of an association which promotes these sins?»
Serious questions. Nonpayment has serious consequences for a teacher: the loss of the job;
perhaps the end of a career; financial hardship for the family.
Payment also has serious consequences. Perhaps, as in Peter’s dilemma, the issue comes down to
denying the gospel. I have had clients who believed that their eternal life was at stake if they continued
to support the union.
Let’s find out how Christ resolved the problem. Matthew 17:27 records Christ saying:
But so that we may not offend them, go to the lake and throw out your line. Take the first
fish you catch, open its mouth and you will find a four-drachma coin. Take it and give it
to them for my tax and yours. (NIV)
We started out with Peter wishing he were fishing. We find out that the solution to this knotty
problem is fishing.
Who could know?
Seriously, this story has two guiding principles that directly translate into my litigation for
religious objectors. First, Christ says «Don’t give offense.» By this I understand Him to say, «Go along
with them as far as your conscience permits.» Second, Christ does not compromise the underlying
principle: His position as the Son of God. He reaffirms who He is by performing a miracle. The miracle
provides the payment.
I must confess that when I get these religious objector calls, I have not had the courage to tell
them to go fishing. However, I think we satisfy both guiding principles in this story with the charity
substitution payment.
Do you know what I mean when I use the term «charity substitution payment?» Instead of
paying union fees to the union, the religious objector pays the amount of the union fees to a mutually
agreed upon charity.
The union claims, just like the drachma collectors, that everyone must pay and those who refuse
are morally deficient. Religious objectors cannot pay the union fees to the union because that would
violate their conscience. Paying the union fees to charity not only satisfies the union’s claim that
everyone must pay, it also keeps the client’s conscience clear. The religious objector has gone as far
along the union’s suggested path as possible without compromising the underlying principle.
A lot of times I hear «good ideas» that are not supported by the law. The charity substitution
payment is supported by the law.
The right of a broad range of religious objectors to make the charity substitution payment did not
arise overnight. Some of the principles were established before I started litigating these claims (which
was 21 years ago). The earliest cases arose in the 70’s and early 80’s and involved employees who were
members of churches which had specific church doctrines prohibiting union membership.(3) These cases
generally involved Seventh-day Adventists, who have a doctrine proscribing union membership.(4)
What about religious objectors who are not Seventh-day Adventists? The first expansion of the
charity substitution doctrine came in a case entitled IAM v. Boeing, 833 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1987) cert.
denied 485 U.S. 1014 (1988). The religious objector in Boeing, an employee named Josephine Nichols,
had the same deeply held religious beliefs as Seventh-day Adventists. She could not be a member of any
labor union. She was not, however, an Adventist. In fact, she wasn’t even a member of the church that
she had regularly attended for 20 years.
The United States Court of Appeals, over the vigorous objection of the Machinists union, held
that she was entitled to the charity substitution accommodation based purely upon her personal religious
beliefs: even though she was not a member of any church.
The next extension of the doctrine came in a case entitled EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904
F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1990). The University of Detroit is a Jesuit institution. The religious objector in that
case, Dr. Robert Roesser, was a member of the university faculty and a member of the Catholic church.
Affiliates of the National Education Association represented the faculty at the university.
The case arose when Dr. Roesser found out that the NEA and its state affiliate were pro-abortion
lobbies. Dr. Roesser could not, consistent with his religious beliefs, join the union or pay any of the
union fee flowing to the NEA and its state affiliate. He asked for an accommodation, and the university
and union refused. The doctor suffered discharge rather than compromise his conscience.
Dr. Roesser’s case was factually unlike any of those which I have described so far in two
significant ways. First, Dr. Roesser did not have a per se objection to labor unions. He could even have
been a member of the NEA if it had not taken a pro-abortion position. Second, and worse, the Catholic
church has historically been regarded as promoting unions.
The United States Court of Appeals determined that individual religious belief should be the
proper focus of inquiry. Since Dr. Roesser’s individual beliefs prevented him from associating with the
NEA and his state affiliate, the court determined he was entitled to an accommodation which would
allow him to redirect his money somewhere else.
That brings us to where we are today. Sincere religious objectors are not required to pay any
money to the offending union. The good news is that this is the litigation position of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). I know of six cases in which the EEOC has been in
court defending this principle. Four of those cases were mine , and the fifth was handled by a lawyer in
my office.
Even better news for most teachers is that the NEA and its affiliates concede the charity
substitution principle even when only personal religious belief is at stake. I find that some affiliates are
sometimes less than forthright in dealing with religious objectors. I find that some affiliates sometimes
stonewall religious objectors when they ask for an accommodation. But if the religious objector insists,
the affiliate will accommodate and will not let the case get into court. A shining example of an NEA
affiliate who consistently does the right thing right away is the Illinois Education Association. Shining
examples of problem affiliates are the NEA-Alaska and the California Teachers Association. (Although
neither one is consistently a problem.)
You say, «Alright, Bruce, I have read the title to your talk. So far you’ve discussed fishing,
preserving the conscience, and protecting freedom. When do we get to the juicy part:
strangling the NEA, defunding the left and other pleasant pursuits?»
That brings us to the rest of the objections in the big circle of objectors I had you create in your
mind. I use the short-hand term «political objectors» to describe the rest of the objectors.
As a litigator, I look at cases from the client’s point of view. That’s my job. But let’s step back
for a minute and look generally at politics today. I doubt that many would dispute the fact that organized
labor is the domestic financial engine of the Democratic party. (The foreign financial engine appears to
be centered in Asia, but the documentation for this is incomplete.) According to figures reported by the
Federal Election Commission (and reproduced in the Statistical Abstract of the United States of 1995),
union political action committees spent just under 95 million dollars on politics.
What the unions report as political (PAC) contributions is just the tip of the iceberg. In addition
to PAC contributions, unions make what is known as «in kind» contributions to political candidates and
causes. An example of an «in kind» contribution is telling a union employee that he can go work on the
campaign of a political candidate instead of his usual union work for the next few months. Printing up
brochures for a candidate is another example. Organizing a phone bank for a candidate is an «in kind»
contribution. In fact, I am told that even some of these examples might not even rise to the level of being
called «in kind» contributions.
Rutgers University economics Professor Leo Troy testified before the Congressional House
Oversight Committee on March 21, 1996. In that testimony, Professor Troy estimated that in a
presidential election year, union «in kind» contributions can be as much as 500 million dollars out of the
estimated 600 billion dollars that unions receive annually in dues.
That adds up to about 600 million dollars (95 + 500). Six-hundred million dollars! That seems
like real money to me. It certainly dwarfs the 35 million figure the AFL-CIO spoke about during the last
election cycle.
This 600 million dollars is basically used to support Democrats. This money spigot of the left is
vulnerable. It is vulnerable because of our litigation on behalf of employees who object to being
compelled to support union politics against their will.
Let’s go back now to our litigation on behalf of political objectors. The picture from the
employee’s view, is that unions are the only institution (other than the government) which can force
support. No matter how much good the Salvation Army does, no matter how much good Focus on the
Family does, no matter how much good your local church does, they do not have the power to force their
hand into your pocket for reimbursement. Normally, this pick-pocket stuff is considered a crime. So,
the employees who call me generally think it is unfair that they should be forced to join or support a
labor union.
An address by Bruce N. Cameron, J.D.
Attorney, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation
Delivered to the Christian Educators Association
July 3, 1997
Their limo had broken down right in front of the train station. So, John Sweeney, the President of
the AFL-CIO, Bob Chase, the President of the National Education Association, and Ron Carey, the
President of the Teamsters union, decided to take the train.
As they approached the ticket booth, Sweeney told the other two, «Trust me on these tickets. I’m
not the tycoon of the train unions for nothin’.» So he bought a single train ticket –just one– for all three
of them.
As they sat waiting in the station, three regular working «stiffs» bought their tickets and sat down
next to them. The working guys recognized the union chiefs and noticed they had only one ticket among
the three of them, so they asked, «How are all three of you going on the train with just one ticket?»
«Just watch,» Sweeney grinned.
When the train came, they all boarded and the three union chieftains trooped into the mens’
bathroom and they all squeezed into one stall. Pretty soon the ticket-collector came to the door of the
stall, calling out «tickets, tickets please.» Sweeney opened the door a crack and stuck out his one ticket.
Needless to say, the regular working guys were pretty impressed.
Later that day, they all found themselves again in the train station waiting for the return trip.
This time the three working guys had only one ticket among them. As they looked over at the union
bosses, not one of them had a ticket. «Wait a minute,» one of the workers said, «we understand now how
you three were able to ride on one ticket, but how do you do it with no ticket?»
Sweeney smiled and said, «Just watch.»
When the train came, the three workers got on and crammed themselves into a bathroom stall.
The union chiefs did the same in the stall next door. A few minutes later Sweeney slipped out of his stall
and called out, «tickets, tickets please.»
Maybe you are here today because this story seems familiar. Perhaps you have the feeling that
union officials want, or worse, have something of yours that does not belong to them? Do you think they
are tricking you out of your money? Maybe they are just threatening you to part with your money?
At the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation we get calls from employees every day
who object to being forced to join or financially support a labor union.
There is good news. No matter where you work, or who you work for, you are entitled to keep
what is yours; and refuse to have your money used to support principles, ideas and policies that are
directly opposed to your beliefs.
Two things can make a difference in how much you pay to the union. They are:
1. Geography; and,
2. The nature of your objection to supporting the union.
We can cover «geography» in 30 seconds. If you work in a Right To Work state (and there are
21 of them(1)) you can decide to pay the union nothing. The only exceptions are for employees who work
in the railroad and airline industries, and those who work on certain federal enclaves.
Explaining how the nature of your objection makes a difference in the amount you pay to the
union takes a bit longer. Draw a mental picture of a big circle. Included in that big circle are all kinds of
objections to unions. Inside the big circle of all objectors is a much smaller circle of a special kind of
religious objector. These religious objectors have special rights. Since this is the Christian Educators
Association, let’s start with the religious objectors and what better place to start than with a Bible story.
Imagine with me, a cool, clear morning. A wind is blowing off the Sea of Galilee.
Peter is standing on the porch, smelling the water, letting the breeze sweep over his face. On days like
this in Capernaum, Peter missed fishing. Soon he was lost in thought about the «big one» that didn’t get
away.
His pleasant daydream was abruptly interrupted by two official-looking gentlemen who suddenly
appeared on the porch next to him. Peter thought they looked like drachma collectors.
For those of you uncertain whether «drachma» is flora or fauna, it is neither. The word literally means
«fistfuls»– of money, that is. The drachma collectors were out gathering the temple tax which every
adult, male, Jew was required to pay.
This morning the drachma collectors had a specific target. That target was Jesus, Peter’s master.
So just as Peter was standing there, wishing he were fishing, the drachma collectors presented him with a
trick question. That question, found in the gospel of Matthew 17:24 was:
«Doesn’t your master pay the temple tax?»
Peter, being a little short on legal and accounting advice, considered only the obvious
implications of such a question. One who dodges taxes is dishonest. Perhaps disloyal. Taxes to support
the temple inject religious questions. So perhaps one who dodges temple taxes does not adhere to the
highest religious standards. At the very minimum a tax dodger is cheap. So in Matthew 17:25 Peter gives
the obvious answer: «Yes, of course, my master pays the temple tax.»
Peter is like me. I’m full of opinions about how my money should be spent. But money
questions for me are all hypothetical questions because I don’t control my money. Do you know the
standard marriage vows have this phrase, «I pledge my troth?» Do you know what a «troth» is? When I
was 23 I didn’t. I asked my wife-to-be what it was that I was pledging. She said, «Darling, troth means
treasure.» So they made that little substitution in my vows.
Like Peter, I don’t have any money.
Because Peter was like me in that regard, he had to walk into the house to get the temple tax
money. There he found, to his amazement, that the drachma collectors were not the only ones interested
in discussing taxes with him. Matthew 17:25 says:
When Peter came into the house, Jesus was the first to speak, «What do you think,
Simon» He asked, «from whom do the kings of the earth collect taxes — from their own
sons or from others?» (NIV*)
Peter began to think his answer might have been a little hasty. He had already confessed that he
believed that Jesus was the Son of the Living God ( 16:16). He knew that the temple was God’s
sanctuary among men. He knew that sons were normally exempt from taxation by their fathers. This
problem could give him a headache. Suddenly, more than ever, he felt he would rather be fishing.
The question of taxation had become a moral issue. If Christ is the Son of God, then He should
not pay the temple tax. For Him to pay the tax would be to acknowledge that He was not the Son of God.
Many teachers today are faced with a parallel problem. They work under a contract which
requires them to either join the teachers union, generally the National Education Association (NEA), or
pay fees to support the union. The drachma collectors come to these teachers and they make these same
kind of arguments: the teachers are told that if they fail to pay they are dishonest, disloyal or maybe just
cheap. Unfortunately, it does not stop with the «sticks and stones» kind of approach. They are also told
that if they do not pay they will be fired.
More and more, just like the light dawning on Peter, teachers today are seeing that serious moral
issues are at stake in the payment of these union fees. Teachers phone me all the time and say, «Do you
know that the NEA is pro-abortion? Do you know that the NEA promotes the homosexual life-style?
Do you know that the NEA attacks what I believe in, calling my Christian views ‘right-wing
extremism?'»(2) They ask, «How can I support both sides of these issues? On Sunday I hear that support
for these activities is sin. The following Monday I read a report in the union newsletter that I am paying
for those activities. How can I teach my Sunday school class on the evils of these sins, while being a part
of an association which promotes these sins?»
Serious questions. Nonpayment has serious consequences for a teacher: the loss of the job;
perhaps the end of a career; financial hardship for the family.
Payment also has serious consequences. Perhaps, as in Peter’s dilemma, the issue comes down to
denying the gospel. I have had clients who believed that their eternal life was at stake if they continued
to support the union.
Let’s find out how Christ resolved the problem. Matthew 17:27 records Christ saying:
But so that we may not offend them, go to the lake and throw out your line. Take the first
fish you catch, open its mouth and you will find a four-drachma coin. Take it and give it
to them for my tax and yours. (NIV)
We started out with Peter wishing he were fishing. We find out that the solution to this knotty
problem is fishing.
Who could know?
Seriously, this story has two guiding principles that directly translate into my litigation for
religious objectors. First, Christ says «Don’t give offense.» By this I understand Him to say, «Go along
with them as far as your conscience permits.» Second, Christ does not compromise the underlying
principle: His position as the Son of God. He reaffirms who He is by performing a miracle. The miracle
provides the payment.
I must confess that when I get these religious objector calls, I have not had the courage to tell
them to go fishing. However, I think we satisfy both guiding principles in this story with the charity
substitution payment.
Do you know what I mean when I use the term «charity substitution payment?» Instead of
paying union fees to the union, the religious objector pays the amount of the union fees to a mutually
agreed upon charity.
The union claims, just like the drachma collectors, that everyone must pay and those who refuse
are morally deficient. Religious objectors cannot pay the union fees to the union because that would
violate their conscience. Paying the union fees to charity not only satisfies the union’s claim that
everyone must pay, it also keeps the client’s conscience clear. The religious objector has gone as far
along the union’s suggested path as possible without compromising the underlying principle.
A lot of times I hear «good ideas» that are not supported by the law. The charity substitution
payment is supported by the law.
The right of a broad range of religious objectors to make the charity substitution payment did not
arise overnight. Some of the principles were established before I started litigating these claims (which
was 21 years ago). The earliest cases arose in the 70’s and early 80’s and involved employees who were
members of churches which had specific church doctrines prohibiting union membership.(3) These cases
generally involved Seventh-day Adventists, who have a doctrine proscribing union membership.(4)
What about religious objectors who are not Seventh-day Adventists? The first expansion of the
charity substitution doctrine came in a case entitled IAM v. Boeing, 833 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1987) cert.
denied 485 U.S. 1014 (1988). The religious objector in Boeing, an employee named Josephine Nichols,
had the same deeply held religious beliefs as Seventh-day Adventists. She could not be a member of any
labor union. She was not, however, an Adventist. In fact, she wasn’t even a member of the church that
she had regularly attended for 20 years.
The United States Court of Appeals, over the vigorous objection of the Machinists union, held
that she was entitled to the charity substitution accommodation based purely upon her personal religious
beliefs: even though she was not a member of any church.
The next extension of the doctrine came in a case entitled EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904
F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1990). The University of Detroit is a Jesuit institution. The religious objector in that
case, Dr. Robert Roesser, was a member of the university faculty and a member of the Catholic church.
Affiliates of the National Education Association represented the faculty at the university.
The case arose when Dr. Roesser found out that the NEA and its state affiliate were pro-abortion
lobbies. Dr. Roesser could not, consistent with his religious beliefs, join the union or pay any of the
union fee flowing to the NEA and its state affiliate. He asked for an accommodation, and the university
and union refused. The doctor suffered discharge rather than compromise his conscience.
Dr. Roesser’s case was factually unlike any of those which I have described so far in two
significant ways. First, Dr. Roesser did not have a per se objection to labor unions. He could even have
been a member of the NEA if it had not taken a pro-abortion position. Second, and worse, the Catholic
church has historically been regarded as promoting unions.
The United States Court of Appeals determined that individual religious belief should be the
proper focus of inquiry. Since Dr. Roesser’s individual beliefs prevented him from associating with the
NEA and his state affiliate, the court determined he was entitled to an accommodation which would
allow him to redirect his money somewhere else.
That brings us to where we are today. Sincere religious objectors are not required to pay any
money to the offending union. The good news is that this is the litigation position of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). I know of six cases in which the EEOC has been in
court defending this principle. Four of those cases were mine , and the fifth was handled by a lawyer in
my office.
Even better news for most teachers is that the NEA and its affiliates concede the charity
substitution principle even when only personal religious belief is at stake. I find that some affiliates are
sometimes less than forthright in dealing with religious objectors. I find that some affiliates sometimes
stonewall religious objectors when they ask for an accommodation. But if the religious objector insists,
the affiliate will accommodate and will not let the case get into court. A shining example of an NEA
affiliate who consistently does the right thing right away is the Illinois Education Association. Shining
examples of problem affiliates are the NEA-Alaska and the California Teachers Association. (Although
neither one is consistently a problem.)
You say, «Alright, Bruce, I have read the title to your talk. So far you’ve discussed fishing,
preserving the conscience, and protecting freedom. When do we get to the juicy part:
strangling the NEA, defunding the left and other pleasant pursuits?»
That brings us to the rest of the objections in the big circle of objectors I had you create in your
mind. I use the short-hand term «political objectors» to describe the rest of the objectors.
As a litigator, I look at cases from the client’s point of view. That’s my job. But let’s step back
for a minute and look generally at politics today. I doubt that many would dispute the fact that organized
labor is the domestic financial engine of the Democratic party. (The foreign financial engine appears to
be centered in Asia, but the documentation for this is incomplete.) According to figures reported by the
Federal Election Commission (and reproduced in the Statistical Abstract of the United States of 1995),
union political action committees spent just under 95 million dollars on politics.
As I mentioned before, with some exceptions, unions do not have the right to pick your pocket if
you live in a Right to Work state. (Like where we are right now — the great Commonwealth of Virginia.)
The view of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation is consistent with what these
employees tell me and it is consistent with state Right to Work laws. The Foundation believes that no
employee should be forced to contribute any money to a union against his will.
We argued that point before the Supreme Court on behalf of public employees in Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). We gave the Supreme Court two arguments. First,
we said employees should be completely free to choose whether they support a labor union. There
should be no forced payment for forced representation. Second, we said if you disagree with us, you
should at least agree that employees should not be forced to support the union’s political agenda.
The Supreme Court disagreed with our first argument, but agreed with our second argument —
no one can be forced to support the union’s politics. Abood set the precedent for all public employees.
Thereafter, we brought two cases to the Supreme Court which covered nearly the rest of all of
employees in the United States: those covered by the Railway Labor Act (railway and airline employees)
and those covered by the National Labor Relations Act (private sector employees). Those two cases, Ellis
v. BRAC, 466 U.S. 435 (1984) and Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) established
that no employee could be required to support the political agenda of any union.
With those three cases, Abood, Ellis and Beck, we locked in the rights of virtually every
employee in the United States. We also nailed to the wall every union whose officials thought they had
some sort of right to use your money to support their pet political agenda.
Years ago I was traveling in Maine on business with another lawyer from our office. Anyone
from Maine? I was sort of lost. Guys are never really lost, right?. It might take an hour of driving
around to realize where we are, but we are not lost. While driving, I noticed something unique with the
road system in this part of Maine. The road signs tell you what street or road you are crossing (generally
a minor road), but they do not tell you the name of the main road you are on!
Although we were not really lost, the road labeling system was not helping us to find our
location. In desperation, we finally pulled over for directions. A local fellow in a store told us we were
on the right road and we should continue on the road and turn at «Devil’s Hill.» We drove the direction
he said, but we never saw any sign, or anything else, that said «Devils Hill.» Finally, we drove back to
the same store, saw the same fellow, and told him that although we were not lost, we could not find any
sign for «Devil’s Hill.» «Oh,» he laughed, «that is just what we locals call the place. I guess there is no
sign.»
Instead of just telling you that you do not have to pay for union politics, let me give you
specific directions so you can better understand your rights and not «get lost.» I’m talking now about all
objectors– except religious objectors. The procedure for religious objectors is a bit more complicated
and is explained in a booklet that I wrote. I have several more booklets with me that I’ll be glad to give
you for free.
The first step to keeping more of your own money is to resign from the union. If you are a
member, the unions say, «Hey, you’ve agreed to support our politics.» So if you do not agree, and want
to get your money back, you need to resign.
Once you are no longer a member, the union has to tell you something about how it spends its
money before it can ask you for any of your money. This is really an amazing thing. The union can keep
its own members in the dark about how it spends their money, but if it wants money from nonmembers it
has to cough up an audited statement of its finances. I remember a case I had years ago in which I was
taking the deposition of a union officer. I asked him why he had not given my (nonmember) client
financial information about the union. «Why should we give it to her,» he protested, «when they don’t
even give it to me!»
This requirement that unions give nonmembers financial information about the union comes
from another case we won before the Supreme Court: Chicago Teachers Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S.
292 (1986). Here is the logic behind Hudson. Let’s say that union dues are $200 a year. The union tells
nonmembers that the nonmember fee, the agency fee, is $150 a year. How would you know if $150 was
right? Do you have to trust union officials to correctly calculate the collective bargaining costs?
The answer is, «no,» you do not have to trust them. Ronald Reagan said, «Trust, but verify.» The
Supreme Court said essentially the same thing. This does not have to be a matter of trusting the union.
Instead, the union has to give you «verified» — and by that I believe they meant audited — financial
information so you can make your own judgment on whether the union’s fee claim is about right.
At this point (after you have looked at the union’s financial documents) you have to make a
decision. If you look at the union’s numbers and finally decide you don’t care, or if you think the fee
claim is about right, that is the end of it. You pay what the union claims is chargeable. Various unions
have different twists to their procedures. Generally, you have to object to pay the reduced fee (as
calculated by the union). If you make your wishes known to the union, you pay the reduced fee and keep
the rest in your pocket. The union has to find someone else to pay for its politics that you just refused to
support.
On the other hand, if you look at the union’s numbers and you think they are wrong, you can
make the union prove its fee claim. In Hudson, another requirement the Supreme Court placed upon
unions is that they must tell you that you are entitled to a hearing if you think the union’s numbers are
wrong.
To obtain a hearing on a further reduction, you must object! Objecting, and letting the union
know you think its calculations are wrong, is the key to this hearing. With most unions you do not get
any reduction unless you object. No union will undertake the burden of proving its fee claims unless you
object.
Let me repeat this. If you think the union is charging you too much, you have to let them know.
You do not have to explain yourself. You do not have to be right. All you have to do is say, «I object. I
think you are charging me too much, and I only want to pay for collective bargaining, and not for
politics.»
If you do object, at the hearing, the union carries the burden of proof. Not you. The union has to
prove that its agency fee numbers are correct. Until the union proves this number, the union does not get
your money. That is right. Your money stays in an escrow account until the union proves its fee claims.
This is another requirement the Supreme Court placed upon unions in Hudson. The union has to tell you
about your right to have the money safely in escrow while the union goes about proving its fee claim.
Of course, if you do not dispute part of the fee, if you agree that the union is entitled to a certain
portion of the fee, then that amount goes to the union. By the same token, any amount that the union
agrees was used for politics goes to you. So it is just the disputed money that is held in escrow.
Now you ask, «How can I know if my union is charging me the right fee amount?» The most
obvious first step is to look at what kind of expenses the union claims are chargeable to you. The
general standard is that the union can charge you for collective bargaining expenses, but cannot charge
you for political expenses.
We are continually involved in litigation over what comes under each of these categories.
However, we have gotten decisions from the Supreme Court which help to paint the picture of what
constitutes collective bargaining and what constitutes politics. Let me just give you a «thumb-nail
sketch» of what is chargeable and what is not.
Contributions to political candidates or campaigns is nonchargeable. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has essentially said that if the union passes some low evidentiary hurdles, collective
bargaining anywhere is chargeable. By that I mean that teachers in Massachusetts can be forced to help
defray the NEA’s collective bargaining expenses in Alaska. (Go figure that! This point is one we battled
to the bitter end.)
Lobbying is not chargeable. Even lobbying on teacher certification issues is not chargeable. The
only lobbying that is chargeable is lobbying required to approve your contract or give specific funding
for your contract. Lobbying on general tax increases, even when it goes to fund the schools, is not
chargeable to teachers.
Almost all union litigation expenses are not chargeable. The exception is if the union is litigating
on behalf of your bargaining unit.
Organizing expenses are not chargeable. (Some unions continue to fight us on litigation and
organizing expenses and some labor boards have refused to follow Supreme Court precedent.)
Union newspaper expenses are chargeable to the extent that they report on chargeable activity.
If you have other specific categories of expenses, you can ask me later during the question and
answer period.
Alright. Jerry Maguire says, «Show me the money.» You want to know, how much money can a
political objector save? When we started litigating these cases, the unions treated this like a joke. It
reminds me of some of these «life-time» warranties I see in large-print on product packages in the stores.
Have you seen these? You buy a $5.00 -10.00 set of wiper blades and the package says, «Life-time
warranty.» Then you open the package and it says if the product is defective, send them the product and
a check for $6.50 to cover «shipping and handling» and they will send you new wipers. This is not a
«life-time» warranty. This is a life-time offer to keep buying defective wipers for $6.50!
When we first started litigating these cases the Machinists (I believe) would give you a 50 cent
rebate if you mailed your objection to them, certified, return receipt requested. Thus, it cost $2.00 to get
back 50 cents.
That is not how things are today. When we have been in federal court, the agency fee amount
proven by unions ranges from 10-20%. That means you get to keep 80-90% of dues. When we litigate
before state labor boards, the unions are found to have proven a fee of 50-70%. That means you get to
keep 30-50% of dues.
Even apart from litigation, just knowing that the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation is in the wings ready to file suit, results in unions today being much more reasonable in their
initial agency fee claims. Take for example, the National Education Association. I think we have sued
the NEA more than any other union. The NEA initially sets its agency fee at about 70% of dues.
Sometimes it dips under 70%. The NEA’s state affiliates generally claim a higher fee.
In California, where we have litigated against the NEA and its state affiliate the California
Teachers Association (CTA), they set the total agency fee (including the NEA, CTA and local) at about
63% of union dues.
What that means in California, is that every nonmember who simply sends in a postcard to the
union saying, «I object,» gets about a $200 rebate from the union. No separate litigation is required.
Remember, this is just the union’s initial claim. Presumably, if we litigated the 63% with them, it would
even be lower.
In Illinois, we have been routinely settling with the NEA affiliate there for 62% of total dues. For religious objectors in Illinois, that 62% goes to charity.
In Massachusetts, where I have litigated against the NEA for about twenty years, my clients generally paid less than 15% of dues for the first ten years. The next ten years is currently in litigation. The state labor board has handed down a decision, currently on appeal, which covers about five of those years. The result of that decision has my clients paying about 60% of dues. (Precision on this number is complicated by a settlement and the fact that the board has not completely adjudicated the case yet. We trust the appeal will further lower this number.)
Let me just summarize for you. Foundation-supported litigation has played a substantial part in creating the following state of the law: No employee in the United States is required to be a union member; Non-union employees covered by Right to Work laws are not required to pay any union fees; Even employees who are not covered by Right to Work laws have the right to limit their fee payment to reimbursement for collective bargaining costs. Employees with sincere religious objections may be able to redirect their entire union fee to charity.
* Scripture taken from the Holy Bible, New International Version, copyright 1973, 1978, 1984
International Bible Society. Used by permission of Zondervan Bible Publisher’s.
