1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	W. James Young, Esq. c/o National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc. 8001 Braddock Road, Suite 600 Springfield, Virginia 22160 (703) 321-8510 Steven R. Burlingham, Esq. California Bar No. 88544 Gary, Till & Burlingham 5330 Madison Avenue, Suite F Sacramento, California 95841 (916) 332-8122 Facsimile — (916) 332-8153 Attorneys For Plaintiffs And The Class They Seek To Represent	
10 11	United States District Court For The Eastern District Of California	
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	DIANNE KNOX; WILLIAM L. BLAYLOCK; ROBERT A. CONOVER; EDWARD L. DOBROWOLSKI, JR.; KARYN GIL; THOMAS JACOB HASS; PATRICK JOHNSON; JON JUMPER; AND R. PAUL RICKER, ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND THE CLASS THEY SEEK TO REPRESENT, Plaintiffs, V. STEVE WESTLY, Controller, State of California; AND CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC, Defendants.	CASE NO. CLASS ACTION PLAINTIFFS' VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
232425262728	COMPLAINT 1. This is a civil rights, class action seeking immediate injunctive and declaratory relief, and nominal and compensatory damages and/or restitution, to redress and prevent the deprivation, through action by Defendants acting under color of state law, of Plaintiff public employees' rights,	

privileges and immunities under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

- 2. Specifically, this civil rights action seeks to prevent CSEA from increasing the amount of money taken from the wages of public employees as dues or compulsory fees and using the temporary assessment as an involuntary loan to defeat various California political propositions on the **8 November 2005** ballot, and to take other political or ideological actions which are contrary to the beliefs and positions of the public employees. These deductions have been and will continue to be conducted in a manner which violates Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as set forth in the United States Supreme Court's decisions establishing the procedures and safeguards, and limiting the circumstances, under which the temporary assessment in dues and fees may constitutionally be collected from public employees. These safeguards include notice to all potential objectors of the purpose(s) for which the temporary assessment is to be used and spent, and an appropriately justified advance reduction or advance rebate in the amount of the temporary assessment used wholly for ballot propositions, political activities and other nonbargaining activities.
- 3. Once the employees' money is spent contrary to their wishes to affect: (1) the outcome of the ballot propositions; (2) the Governor's programs; and (3) political or ideological matters, and for other nonbargaining activities, the employees' First Amendment rights are irretrievably lost. Accordingly, immediate injunctive relief is necessary to maintain the *status quo* and prevent the irreparable injury and loss of the First Amendment rights of the employees and the class or classes they seek to represent.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 4. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, particularly the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The jurisdiction of this Court, therefore, is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
- 5. This is also an action under the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of rights, privileges and

immunities secured to Plaintiffs and class members by the Constitution of the United States, particularly the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments thereto. The jurisdiction of this Court, therefore, is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) & (4), pursuant to which this Court may grant: a) damages or restitution for the violation of Plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the amount of the temporary assessment unconstitutionally collected and used, plus interest; b) injunctive relief against the future collection or spending of the temporary assessment; c) nominal damages for the violation of Plaintiffs' federally protected rights; and d) reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

- 6. This is also a case of actual controversy where Plaintiffs are seeking a declaration of their rights under the Constitution of the United States. Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, this Court may declare the rights of Plaintiffs and grant further necessary and proper relief based thereon, including preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, pursuant to Rule 65, FED.R.CIV.P.
- 7. **Venue:** Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and § 1392, venue is proper in this Court because Defendants either reside and/or have offices and conduct their business in the judicial district of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

PARTIES

- 8. Plaintiffs Dianne Knox, William L. Blaylock, Robert A. Conover, Edward L. Dobrowolski, Jr., Karyn Gil, Thomas Jacob Hass, Patrick Johnson, Jon Jumper, and R. Paul Ricker are, and were at all times mentioned herein, individuals employed by various instrumentalities of the State of California. As such, they are "state employees" within the meaning of the Ralph C. Dills Act, CAL. GOVT. CODE, § 3513(c). Plaintiffs are employed in a bargaining unit designated as "Bargaining Unit 1," which is one bargaining unit of State employees among several represented, exclusively for purposes of collective bargaining with their employer, by Defendant California State Employees Association, Local 1000, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (hereinafter "CSEA" or "the union").
 - a. Plaintiffs Knox, Blaylock, Dobrowolski, Gil, Hass, Johnson, and Jumper,

are not members of CSEA and have not, at any time material hereto, been members of CSEA and/or its affiliates, and nevertheless have been and are subject to the automatic seizure of agency fees, including the temporary assessment;

- b. Until on or after 1 October 2005, Plaintiff Conover was a member of
 CSEA and/or its affiliates, and full union dues were deducted monthly from his wages;
 and
- c. Plaintiff Ricker is, and has been at all times material hereto, a member of CSEA and/or its affiliates, and full union dues have been and continue to be deducted monthly from his wages.
- 9. Defendant Steven Westly (hereinafter "Westly") is the Controller of the State of California. As such, he is charged with the responsibility of issuing wages to employees of the State and/or its Departments, including Plaintiffs, and processing all deductions therefore, including for union dues and so-called "fair share" fees pursuant to "agency shop" agreements. He is sued in his official capacity.
- 10. Defendant California State Employees Association, Local 1000, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC ("CSEA" or "the union") is an "employee organization" as defined in the Ralph C. Dills Act, CAL. GOVT. CODE, § 3513(a), and has been recognized as the exclusive representative under said law for collective bargaining purposes of all State employees in Bargaining Units 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 21. On information and belief, Defendant CSEA is a nonprofit corporation formed and existing under the laws of the State of California. CSEA is headquartered in the Eastern District of California, and conducts its business and operations throughout the State of California, and also within the Eastern District of California.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

11. Plaintiffs' action is a class action brought by Plaintiffs on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2) and, alternatively, Rule 23(b)(3), FED.R.CIV.P. The class that Plaintiffs seek to represent consists

of all former, current, and future State of California employees employed in Bargaining Units 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 21 who are, have been, or will be represented exclusively for purposes of collective bargaining by CSEA, in three subclasses:

- a. All individuals who pay compulsory fees to CSEA who are not members and who have, at one time or another, specifically objected to the use of their union fees for politics or other nonbargaining activities;
- b. All individuals who pay compulsory fees to CSEA who are not members and who have never specifically objected to the use of their union fees for politics or other nonbargaining activities; and
 - c. All individuals who pay dues to CSEA as members.
- 12. The number of persons in this class exceeds one hundred thousand. Upon information and belief, the number of persons in each subclass is believed to number in the thousands, and may be in the tens of thousands. These persons are therefore so numerous that joinder of all members of the class and each subclass obviously is impractical.
- 13. There are questions of law and fact common to all members of the class, towit, whether Defendants may constitutionally and lawfully seize the temporary assessment from the wages of the state employees which are to be used wholly for ballot propositions, political activities and other nonbargaining activities without providing all of the procedural safeguards required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to be given all potential objectors.
- 14. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of other members of the class and each subclass, who are subject to the same deprivations of their rights by CSEA's collection and spending of the temporary assessment, without providing the necessary constitutional safeguards and rights, as hereinafter alleged.
- 15. Plaintiffs can adequately represent the interests of other members of the class and each subclass. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to other members of the class and subclasses related to the subject matter of this lawsuit, since all members of the class and each subclass are "potential objectors" as that term was used by the United States Supreme Court in *Hudson*, 475 U.S. at 306, and are entitled to notice and the procedures and

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27 **28** safeguards required by the Constitution.

- 16. Plaintiffs' attorneys are experienced in representing litigants before this Court. Plaintiffs' counsel is provided *pro bono publico* by a national charitable legal aid organization, and their lead counsel is experienced in representing nonunion employees in litigation. including class actions, involving issues identical or similar to those raised in this action, and in fact, has litigated the most recent leading cases addressing these issues in this Circuit. Plaintiffs' attorneys are well qualified to be appointed class counsel by the Court.
- 17. Because the unions' duty not to invade the First Amendment rights of the public employees applies equally to all in the class and each subclass, the prosecution of separate actions by individual class member public employees would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants.
- 18. Defendants have acted and threaten to continue to act on grounds generally applicable to all members of the class and each subclass, thereby making appropriate final declaratory, injunctive and other relief with regard to the class, and each subclass as a whole.
- 19. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the class and each subclass predominate over questions affecting only individual employees, in that the important and controlling questions of law and fact are common to all State employees in the class and subclasses, i.e., whether Defendants have complied with the constitutional requirements for collecting from the employees the temporary assessment earmarked wholly for ballot propositions, political activities and other nonbargaining activities.
- 20. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, inasmuch as the individual class member employees are deprived of the same rights by Defendants' actions and threatened actions. The limited amount of money involved in the case of each employee's claim would make it burdensome for the class, or each subclass, of employees to maintain separate actions.

FACTS

- 21. Acting in concert under color of state law to-wit, the Ralph C. Dills Act, CAL.

 GOVT. CODE § 3512, et seq. the State of California has recognized Defendant CSEA as the exclusive bargaining agent for the Plaintiffs and other State employees in bargaining units designated as Bargaining Units 1 (Professional, Administrative, Financial, and Staff Services bargaining unit), 3 (Education and Library bargaining unit), 4 (Office and Allied workers bargaining unit), 11 (Engineering and Scientific Technician bargaining unit), 14 (Printing Trades bargaining unit), 15 (Allied Services bargaining unit), 17 (Registered Nurses bargaining unit), 20 (Medical and Social Services Specialists bargaining unit), and 21 (Education, Library, and Maritime bargaining unit). CSEA and the State of California have entered into a series of Memoranda of Understanding ("MOUs") controlling the terms and conditions of employment for Plaintiffs and the class and subclasses of State employees Plaintiffs seek to represent.
- 22. Pursuant to the Ralph C. Dills Act, CAL. GOVT. CODE § 3512, the State and CSEA have entered into MOUs governing these bargaining units, including a provision requiring that all State employees in Bargaining Units 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 21 join CSEA as formal union members, or have deducted from their wages agency fees, as a condition of continued public employment.
- 23. On or about 30 July 2005, the Local 1000 (CSEA) Council proposed an "Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight-Back Fund" for "use[]d for a broad range of political expenses, including television and radio advertising, direct mail, voter registration, voter education, and get out the vote activities in our work sites and in our communities across California," specifically stating that "The Fund will not be used for regular costs of the union -- such as office rent, staff salaries or routine equipment replacement, etc." A true and correct copy of the motion to pass this temporary assessment, taken from CSEA's website (http://www.seiu1000.org/august_fight_back_fund. cfm) is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit A.
- 24. On or about 27 August 2005, CSEA General Council delegates voted to impose a "temporary dues increase (1/4th of 1 percent of salary)" or assessment, effective 1 September 2005, to create what CSEA characterizes as "a Political Fight Back Fund to be used for advertising, mail, voter registration and education, and get-out-the-vote activities...." *CSEA Unity*, September 2005, page 1 (a

true and correct copy of said letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit B).

- 25. CSEA's temporary assessment, which actually ranges from 25% to 36% depending on the job classification and monthly salary, began with the 30 September 2005, paycheck issued to State employees, and is targeted primarily, if not wholly, at the defeat of certain ballot propositions in a special election to be held on 8 November 2005, fighting, *inter alia*, the Governor's electoral and political financing policies, and to support other political and nonbargaining actions. Specifically, the temporary assessment will "be used specifically in the political arenas of California to defend and advance the interests of members of Local 1000 and the important public services they provide," and will be "used for a broad range of political expenses, including television and radio advertising, direct mail, voter registration, voter education, and get out the vote activities in ... work sites and in ... communities across California." CSEA has represented specifically that "The Fund will not be used for regular costs of the union such as office rent, staff salaries or routine equipment replacement, etc.," and that this temporary assessment will generate approximately \$12 million for CSEA's political activities. Exhibit A.
- 26. CSEA's temporary assessment began with the 30 September 2005 paychecks issued to State employees. The normal \$45.00 per month dues cap does not apply to this temporary assessment, and monthly dues now range from \$29.78 for a janitor to \$61.25 for an education consultant. Union dues in the amount of \$66.77 was deducted from Plaintiff Conover's September paycheck.
- 27. CSEA opposes Propositions 75 & 76. The Alliance for a Better California, a coalition of the State's public employee labor unions, of which CSEA is a member which it actively supports, also opposes Propositions 74, 77, & 78, and supports Propositions 79 & 80. CSEA has contributed to the Alliance and other political committees opposing Propositions 75 & 76.
- 28. Plaintiffs support some or all of the propositions CSEA opposes, oppose some or all of the propositions CSEA supports, and/or do not believe that their dues or forced fees should be used on any ballot proposition and other political and nonbargaining activities.
- 29. Plaintiffs have a First Amendment right to prevent the temporary assessment from being used for or against ballot propositions and other political and nonbargaining activities which conflict with their own personal preferences.

- 30. Plaintiffs also have a First Amendment right to adequate procedures which will, *inter alia*, give the employees adequate advance notice of the political and other nonbargaining uses to which the temporary assessment is targeted. Such notice would allow them to make an informed decision on whether their union dues and/or agency fees are (or will be) used for political and other nonbargaining activities which conflict with their own personal preferences so that they can prevent the use of their moneys for ballot propositions and other political and nonbargaining activities that they oppose. **See** *Teachers Local No. 1 v. Hudson*, 475 U.S. 292, 306-10 (1986).
- 31. During the month of June 2005, CSEA sent a notice ("CSEA's 2005 Notice") to most or all of its nonmember employees. CSEA did not send any such notice to its members. This notice preceded the vote for a temporary assessment by approximately two-to-three months, contained no notice that a political dues and fees increase would be included in the 2005-06 dues and fees, and stated that "Dues are subject to change without further notice to fee payers." A true and correct copy of said notice is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit C.
- 32. CSEA's 2005 Notice set the agency fee to be seized from 1 July 2005, through 30 June 2006 ("2005-06 fiscal year"), at 99.1% of dues. CSEA's 2005 Notice also informed nonmembers that a reduced agency fee of 56.35% of CSEA's annual dues, or 0.5635% of pay, would be charged to nonmembers who objected to paying the full agency fee and requested a rebate pursuant to the procedures and deadlines outlined in CSEA's 2005 Notice. The 56.35% is based on CSEA's actual expenditures for the year ending 31 December 2004, in which CSEA calculated chargeable expenditures to be 56.35% of its total expenditures.
- 33. On or about 31 August 2005, CSEA sent another letter, addressed to "Local 1000 Members and Fair Share Fee Payers." As it affected union members, *inter alia*, said letter announced the dues increase, and stated that "The \$45 per month cap on our regular dues of 1% of gross pay will continue in effect, but will not apply to this additional .0025 temporary increase." As it affected nonmember objectors, *inter alia*, said letter announced that "Fair Share fees will rise by .002478 of gross monthly salary." A true and correct copy of said letter is attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit D.
 - 34. Since 1 September 2005, the agency fee deducted from the wages of all nonmember

objectors by Westly and transmitted to CSEA for its spending has been increased by 0.2478% of salary, a 24.78% - 35.75% or more increase of monthly fees paid. Thus, the actual reduced agency fee charged objecting nonmembers in 2005-06 includes 99.12% of the 25% temporary assessment, which increase has been imposed solely for nonchargeable political and ideological purposes, resulting in a forced loan from them that will be spent on the ballot propositions and other political and nonbargaining activities to which they object.

- 35. Since 1 September 2005, the agency fee deducted from the wages of nonmembers failing to object by Westly and transmitted to CSEA for its spending has been increased by 0.2478% of salary, a 24.78% 35.78% increase of monthly fees paid.
- 36. Since 1 September 2005, the dues paid by union members and collected by CSEA for its spending has been increased by 0.25% of salary, a 25%-36.10% or more increase of monthly dues paid.
- 37. Moreover, CSEA's pre-1 September 2005, spending on the ballot propositions and other political and nonbargaining activities facilitated by the temporary assessment will not be included in setting the new reduced agency fee percentage until 2006, more than six months after the initial seizures; and the 1 September through 8 November 2005, spending on the ballot propositions and other political and nonbargaining activities facilitated by the fee increase will not be included in setting the new reduced agency fee percentage until 2007, eighteen months later.
- 38. CSEA's usual agency fee procedure allows CSEA to force nonmembers to loan it the increased fee amount to spend and use on the ballot propositions and other political and nonbargaining activities, which CSEA will not begin to "repay" for six months and not fully "repay" until eighteen months after the first seizures. In addition, CSEA's repayment of the forced loan is contingent upon the nonmember remaining employed by the State in a bargaining unit represented by CSEA, and objection in both of the subsequent years.
- 39. In early September 2005, after receiving Exhibit D hereto, Plaintiff Dobrowolski called CSEA's Sacramento office, and was told to call its Riverside office. He did so, and left a message for Jodi Smith, area manager, asking that she call him back. Smith returned his call and stated that, even if Dobrowolski objected to the payment of the full agency fees, *via* a letter in June, there was nothing

he could do about the September increase for the temporary assessment. She also stated that "we are in the fight of our lives," and that the temporary assessment was needed, and that there was nothing that could be done to stop CSEA's expenditure of the temporary assessment for political purposes.

- 40. As a result of the timing of CSEA's increase in their dues and fees, the minimum procedures required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as explained in *Hudson*, have not been provided to the employees and the class they seek to represent, all of whom are potential objectors to CSEA's use of the increase in the dues and fees primarily, if not wholly, for ballot propositions, political and other nonbargaining purposes.
- 41. Specifically, CSEA has not provided Plaintiffs Knox, Blaylock, Dobrowolski, Gil, Hass, Johnson, Jumper, and other nonmember State employees with an opportunity to object to the use of the fee increase on the ballot propositions, politics and other nonbargaining activities; and an immediate refund or reduction of the increased fee amount. Absent such immediate procedural protections, the nonmember State employees are forced to loan the increase in their fees to CSEA for its use and spending on the ballot propositions, politics and other nonbargaining activities which they oppose and which they cannot constitutionally be required to subsidize.
- 42. CSEA has not provided Plaintiffs Conover and Ricker and the other member State employees, who are potential objectors, with: (1) an opportunity to resign and, as nonmembers, raise an objection to the use of the dues/fee increase on the ballot propositions, politics and other nonbargaining activities; and (2) an immediate refund or reduction of the increased dues/fee amount. Without such immediate procedural protections, the member State employees are forced to loan the increase in their dues to the CSEA for its use and spending on the ballot propositions, politics and other nonbargaining activities which the members oppose and which they cannot constitutionally be required to subsidize.

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE PROCEDURES

- 43. The forgoing paragraphs are re-alleged.
- 44. The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require that the procedures for the collection of compulsory union dues and fees be carefully tailored to limit the

infringement on the public employees' fundamental First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, petition, belief and thought by facilitating the public employees' ability, as potential objectors, to protect those rights, including the right not to have their moneys used and spent on ballot propositions, political and other nonbargaining activities to which they object and the right not to have their objection met by a forced loan, followed by a rebate months, if not years, later.

45. Under color of state law, Defendants have collected and continue to collect an increase in compulsory dues and fees which CSEA has targeted, and will use and spend primarily on the upcoming ballot propositions election and for politics and other nonbargaining activities without first providing the carefully tailored procedures required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. This deprives the public employees of their constitutional right to due process and proper procedures.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: FREE SPEECH

- 46. Paragraphs 1 through 42 are realleged.
- 47. Under color of state law, Defendants collect and continue to collect an increase in compulsory dues and fees from the public employees which CSEA has targeted, and will use and spend primarily on the upcoming ballot propositions election and for other political and nonbargaining activities contrary to the public employees' political preferences.
- 48. Without being provided with an immediate rebate of or reduction in the increase in dues and fees being used and spent on ballot propositions and other political and nonbargaining activities, the objecting public employees are being forced to loan the unions their money and are otherwise deprived of their right to free speech, free association and political autonomy under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

49. Unless immediately restrained by this Court, Defendants' seizure of the increase in dues and fees from the named Plaintiffs' and class members' wages has directly caused, and will continue to cause, Plaintiffs and the class members they seek to represent to suffer the irreparable

injury that is inherent in the violation of First Amendment rights and for which there is no adequate remedy at law and has deprived and will continue to deprive them of portions of their wages without due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs request the following relief from this Court:

- A. Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction: Immediately issue, pending a hearing on Plaintiffs' prayer for permanent relief, a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction restraining Defendant CSEA, its officers, agents, assistants, successors, employees, attorneys, and all persons acting in concert or cooperating with it or at its direction or under its control, from accepting any payroll deductions or direct payment of the increase in union dues and fees from the wages of any named Plaintiff and any of the class members they represent, from disbursing any of the increase in union dues and fees still in its possession and/or control, and requiring said Defendant to restore the *status quo* by placing any increase in dues and fees it has received or will receive into the registry of the Court or a Court-supervised escrow account, until further order of the Court.
- **B.** Class Certification: Enter an order, as soon as practical, certifying this case as a class action consisting of the class of all individuals who pay compulsory dues or fees to Defendant CSEA, as outlined in the three subclasses identified in \P 13, supra; and appointing Plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel.
- **C. Declaratory Judgment:** Enter a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, declaring:
 - 1) that the named Plaintiffs and class members have a constitutional right to an advance "*Hudson*" notice of the temoprary assessment and increase in the dues and fees to be used in the upcoming ballot proposition special election and for other politics;
 - 2) that the named Plaintiffs and class members have a constitutional right to receive advance notice of how they can object to their temporary assement being used in the upcoming ballot proposition special election and for other politics; and
 - 3) that the objectors have a constitutional right to prevent the unions from using and spending the temporary assessment in the upcoming ballot proposition election and for

other politics and from being forced to provide the unions with a loan for political purposes.

- **D. Permanent Injunction:** Enter a permanent injunction which restrains Defendants, their officers, agents, assistants, successors, employees, attorneys, and all persons acting in concert or cooperating with them or at their direction or under their control, to place in escrow all of the money which they have collected or received and will collect or receive from the Plaintiffs and class members as a result of the temporary assessment, which CSEA has targeted wholly for ballot propositions, political activities and other nonbargaining activities, into the registry of the Court or a Court-supervised escrow account, until such time as the Court is satisfied that Defendants have provided all the necessary pre-collection safeguards and procedures mandated by the Constitution
- **E. Damages:** Award each named Plaintiff and class member compensatory damages or restitution from CSEA in the amount of the increase in the dues or fees collected and not previously returned, with statutory interest, that has been spent on, or targeted for, ballot propositions, political activities and other nonbargaining activities to which the Plaintiff and class member objects; and nominal damages from the appropriate Defendant for its violations of the Plaintiffs' and class members' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
- **F.** Costs and Attorneys Fees: Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, award the Plaintiffs their costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the litigation of this case.
- G. Other: Grant the Plaintiffs such other and further legal or equitable relief as the Court may deem just and proper.DATED: November 2005

Respectfully submitted,

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